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| Ryo 
| #RYO
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| RYO Price: | $0.035 | | Volume: | $725 | | All Time High: | $0.68 | | Market Cap: | $1.9 M |
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| Circulating Supply: | 54,504,353 |
| Exchanges: | 1+
| | Total Supply: | 54,504,353 |
| Markets: | 1+
| | Max Supply: | 80,188,888 |
| Pairs: | 4
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The last known price of #RYO is $0.035 USD.
 Please note that the price of #RYO was last updated over 120 days ago. This can occur when coins have sporadic price reporting, no listings on exchanges or the project has been abandonded. All #RYO statistics should be considered as 'last known value'.
The lowest RYO price for this period was $0, the highest was $0.035, and the exact last price of RYO was $0.03505.
The all-time high RYO coin price was $0.68.
Use our custom price calculator to see the hypothetical price of RYO with market cap of SOL or other crypto coins. |
The code for Ryo crypto currency is also #RYO.
Ryo is 6.5 years old. |
The current market capitalization for Ryo is $1,910,550.
Ryo is ranking upwards to #6248, by market cap (and other factors). |
The trading volume is weak during the past 24 hours for #RYO.
Today's 24-hour trading volume across all exchanges for Ryo is $725. |
| The circulating supply of RYO is 54,504,353 coins, which is 68% of the maximum coin supply. |
RYO has limited pairings with other cryptocurrencies, but has at least 4 pairings and is listed on at least 1 crypto exchange.
View #RYO trading pairs and crypto exchanges that currently support #RYO purchase. |
Senior NASA engineer calls out Howard Chu (hyc_symas, Monero developer) on being a fraud
Senior NASA engineer calls out Howard Chu (hyc_symas, Monero developer) for being a fraud - I just read a news story so bizarre that I had to go through with it with an analytical eyeSummary of Howard’s claims [1]. Take good note of timing — 20 minutes into the flight. Dates will become important Ed Caro, senior engineer at NASA in charge of the system Howard claims so gallantly saved mid-flight, makes following claims: His story doesn’t add up on a technical level. There were multiple backups in place that would have prevented both vehicle failure and data loss., His dates don’t add up. Howard claims to have worked in JPL from 1991 till 1993. The mission launched on 9th of April 1994, Actually, nobody he knows remembers Howard working on the project. One person remembers Howard’s older brother, Eugene. Source: [ 2], Now, here is where the story, as published by a minor cryptocurrency news site, takes a really bizarre turn. Apparently someone calling himself Eugene wrote to them, twice. And a second reply: For the record, I don’t think it was either Eugene or Howard writing those emails. A lot of holders of Monero cryptocurrency will perceive this story as a threat to their money — so it was most likely just a random community member. If you worked at JPL on SIR-C project, and do — or do not remember Howard Chu, please email fireice.xmr@gmail.com and I will include your email in the story.
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Quick analysis of the BCH “50% attack” drama
Thumbnail Today I woke up to 3 separate people asking me “WTF is going on with Bitcoin Cash” — mostly from LTC controlled Telegram channels. Let’s have a quick critical look to see if anything is amiss, shall we?Difficulty, block time and height export — docs.google.com As you can see from the graph, the 3-hour gap was most likely caused by a large (around 10% of the total hashrate) miner leaving the network. In the period after that we had 149 blocks in 22 hours, which works out to 6.7 per hour with a target of 6. This is pretty normal, a change in the difficulty of this magnitude is bound to cause oscillations of over and under adjustments. As I’m writing this, the hashrate is rising again by about 10%, this can easily be explained by people switching on their miners in response to those events. — TLDR; What does it mean?. — There is nothing in the current data that even remotely resembles a 50% attack. The hashrate rose barely by 10%. In the same way that people are looking into their morning toast and seeing the face of Jesus ( en.wikipedia.org ), others are trying to divine an attack from those semi-random numbers.
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Sneak peek at what’s happening in Ryo development trenches
Let’s go atomic - According to Monero talking heads atomic swaps are impossible until you buy Tari. This is of course just a marketing strategy that we have seen thousands of times — gimp the current product to release a new one. We are working on support atomic swaps with BTC via P2SH addresses. The mechanism of atomic swaps is extremely simple and described well here . All we need to implement in Ryo is a conditional timelock that allows earlier spending if you know the shared secret of the swap. — Quasar web-wallet and 64-bit “ChooChoo” Elliptic Curve Crypto library - You might recall me writing it over a year ago. It has proven itself nicely doing the scanning for our webwallet. The next step will be to integrate it into the CLI and GUI wallets to speed up scanning there too. — Implementing cutting edge crypto - Last month, a new and much safer way of encrypting data (AES-GCM-SIV) has been standardised. There aren’t any multi-platform C++ implementations, so we will write one ourselves. We are planning to release it separately under BSD licence, so other projects can benefit from this advancement too. This will improve the security of saved wallets, as well as enabling fast encryption of network traffic. — Putting fun back into P2P - New P2P network with native IPv6 support and more efficient block broadcast The current release will overhaul a large percentage of legacy BytecoinV1 c... 
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On-chain tracking of Monero and other Cryptonotes
Final nail in the coffin of Monero privacy. — *Update to the story* I got banned by Monero community rep (Justin Ehrenhofer) from a “neutral” subreddit by giving this link to people trying to sell Monero — apparently that’s “diruptive” [source] — Introduction - In the previous articles we discussed how to turn churning into incriminating evidence using external metadata [ 1 ] and how lack of churning will let your funds be tracked through simple output tagging (Knacc attack)[ 2 ]. In this article we will discuss how to track churning — and do active tracking attacks on-chain without help of any metadata. In fact you can do it on Monero blockchain right now, without anyone being any wiser. — Simple output merging attack - This attack builds upon the “Heuristic II” attack (section 5.2) from A Traceability Analysis of Monero’s Blockchain by Amrit Kumar, Clément Fischer, Shruti Tople, and Prateek Saxena. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2017. [ link ] In this attack the authors introduce a very simple and intuitive concept. If a transaction spends both outputs of another transaction then it is overwhelmingly likely that those are the real outputs. An observant reader here will notice that additionally it identifies those outputs as belonging to a single entity — even if the actual private keys were different. Both those observations will become important as we move on to show...
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How buying pot with Monero will get you busted — Knacc attack on Cryptonote coins
How buying pot with Monero will get you busted — Knacc attack on Cryptonote coins - *Update to the story* I got banned by Monero community rep (Justin Ehrenhofer) from a “neutral” subreddit by giving this link to people trying to sell Monero — apparently that’s “diruptive” [source] — Introduction - This is part 3 out of 4 of my Cryptonote Tracking series. We created a permanent home for it in /r/CryptoNoteTech subreddit. Feel free to drop by if you are interested in the privacy side of Cryptonote coins. This attack, as the name suggests, was found by Knacc somewhere in early 2017. The original write-up that his article is based on can be found here. TLDR readers should be aware that solutions suggested there are deeply flawed. This article discusses the current state of my own knowledge on this attack. Another source of information on this attack is the official “Breaking Monero” series [ 1 ]. It is fairly long and waffly, as tends to happen when an inexperienced person does a live podcast without a good script. — Hiding in a crowd of one, or perils of a small anonymity set - Essence of a Knacc attack is extremely simple. In our simplified example let’s say that exchange E tags an output that buyer B withdraws on some kind of database. B then uses that output to pay seller S. S then deposits the money back with E.Tagged output for ring size of 3 (3² = 9 possibilities) In case of Mone...
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Exchange Denial of Service in Monero
Introduction - While discussing the previous Monero vulnerability, I confused the issues (they are both related to the fact that the encrypted amount and commitment are separate entities in RingCTs) and accidentally disclosed this one [ 1 ]. Monero team has had over a week now to examine the source code and surprisingly they have not asked us for any details about the bug. — Description of the issue - Wallet does not perform sufficient error handling when an invalid encrypted amount is met. While the RCT library correctly throws an exception; it is caught and the returned amount is set to zero. While there is nothing inherently wrong with this behaviour, wallet will attempt to use zero-sized sums in constructing transactions. This will cause the verification of such transaction to fail. Overall impact of the bug is such that a publicly known wallet address, such as an exchange, can be put out of action through sending many small transactions with invalid encrypted amounts. This outage is not terminal, and a rescan with a fixed wallet will enable the valid outputs to be used. Recommended fix that we implemented in Ryo is to ignore zero amounts altogether. — Why did you not report it to Monero? - Because of their long standing and continuing history of toxic behaviour towards security researchers [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ]. At the request of a Monero moderator I’m adding a link to a community discussion o...
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Fake deposit amount exchange vulnerability in Monero
Foreword to Ryo community - This bug has been fixed in Ryo 7 months ago. Patch is available here, however in case of Monero it might cause a hard fork on exploitation. Another fix is possible by ignoring non-null RingCT coinbase transactions in the wallet. — How does the exploit work? - RingCT has extremely insecure design where the amount displayed to the user (from now called masked amount) is different from the amount checked by the network (from now called commitment). When a coinbase transaction is minted it will include a plaintext amount and a null rct signature. Network will construct commitment from this plaintext amount. However if the coinbase transaction includes non-null rct signature, it will be able to communicate a masked amount too. This essentially means that the attacker can make it appear as if he deposited any sum of his choosing to an exchange. — Why did you not report it Monero? - Because of their long history of toxic behaviour towards security researchers [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] I hope that Monero community uses this opportunity to reconsider their behaviour. — Accidental leak open disclosure - While discussing this exploit on Ryo public channel I confused the issues and accidentally leaked a different issue. Monero might want to get that one patched too. [ 1 ] — Monero Devlopers’ Response - At the request of a Monero moderator I’m adding a link to a community discussion...
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Hiding your IP while using Ryo or other Cryptonotes + IP reveal exploit in Monero/OpenAlian
Hiding your IP while using Ryo or other Cryptonotes + IP reveal exploit in Monero/OpenAlias - — Meta-issues - In what has become a familiar pattern for anyone following our news feed, Monero community got red-faced angry at a mere proposition of me writing this guide, and are likely to do so now. You should be aware that if you provide intelligent criticism of Monero in any way (you don’t even need to be a Ryo supporter, /u/hapticpilot springs to mind) you will be accused by a sock-puppet of being my sock-puppet. The most glorious case was the now-deleted sock-puppet stipulating that actually I run the whole 5 man team of Ryo myself [ 1 ]. I won’t lie to you — being the boogeyman of reason is very satisfying. — Problems - As you might have heard, Ryo (and every other crypto-currency) is a p2p network. An essential feature of such a network is a list of potential peers to connect to. This obviously presents privacy problems: 1 — Every other Ryo daemon will be aware of your IP address. 2 — Your IP address will be tied to the transaction id (but not wallet address) 2A — Everyone on the network will potentially be able to do point 2., 2B — Your ISP will be potentially able to do point 2., 3 — In Monero, your IP address will be tied to your exchange account number (the long 64-character hex id), unless it uses integrated addresses. We fixed that in Ryo already by encrypting i...
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Cryptonight-GPU — FPGA-proof PoW algorithm based on floating point instructions
Cryptonight-GPU — FPGA-proof PoW algorithm based on floating point instructions - — Graveyard of “ASIC/FPGA-proof” and a need for paradigm shift. — To anyone observing development of cryptonight mining algorithms, one thing will become immediately apparent — the claims ASIC resistance simply don’t stack up with historical reality. Current approach, something I call “Look, ma! No hands!”, where the algorithm designers ask “Maybe ASICs can’t do X?”, and then find out how wrong they were, simply does not work. — Can FPGAs do floating point instructions?. — Of course they can. In fact in HPC this is a bit of a marketing number — similar to MPG for cars, therefore you will be easily able to find theoretical TFLOPS in their brochure. So let’s do just that — “Intel boasts of an FPGA chip capable of 10 TFLOPS” … [ 1 ] Hold on… Vega 64 does 12.5 TLOPS… [ 2 ] To get CN-GPU hashrate, take the TFLOPS and multiply them by 125. Simple is beautiful, no? — WTF???? BUT FPGAs ARE SO FAST ON OTHER ALGOS????. — Systemic mistakes in algorithm design, namely trying to pull off a memory hard algorithm where an FPGA can be configured to access memory 100x faster than a CPU, led Monero algorithm designers to believe that FPGAs are some kind of metaphysical entities unbound by the laws of physics. In reality, floating point performance boils down to the physica...
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Tracing Cryptonote ring signatures using external metadata
*Update to the story* I got banned by Monero community rep (Justin Ehrenhofer) from a “neutral” subreddit by giving this link to people trying to sell Monero — apparently that’s “diruptive” [source] Background reading — “Why metadata matters?” by EFF. — What is an attack?. — As we are heading into more technical topics of Cryptonote tracking, I will be using term “attack” for anything that can be used to deanonymise ring signatures. It is important to know that, similar to most practical attacks against cryptography, those attacks don’t tackle cryptography directly. Instead they rely on how transactions and people making the transactions interact. In fact this attack is a simple application of textbook forensic techniques to ring signatures. As no single attack that I’m aware of is an “I win” button, it is important to understand their relative strengths and weaknesses. — What are the general properties of metadata analysis?. — A single expression that I would use to describe is “churn killer”. Since the anonymity set provided by a ring signature is fairly small, a very naive and stupid advice would be “just send money to yourself a couple times”. Metadata attack turns churning into incriminating evidence in a scenario where you are trying to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a transaction occurred between Alice and Bob. Another interesting property of m...
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