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RSK Smart Bitcoin  


RBTC Price:
$3.7 K
All Time High:
Market Cap:
$59.6 M

Circulating Supply:
Total Supply:
Max Supply:


The price of #RBTC today is $18,983 USD.

The lowest RBTC price for this period was $0, the highest was $18,983, and the exact current price of one RBTC crypto coin is $18,982.80435.

The all-time high RBTC coin price was $79,083.

Use our custom price calculator to see the hypothetical price of RBTC with market cap of ETH or other crypto coins.


The code for RSK Smart Bitcoin is #RBTC.

RSK Smart Bitcoin is 3.8 years old.


The current market capitalization for RSK Smart Bitcoin is $59,624,988.

RSK Smart Bitcoin is ranked #275 out of all coins, by market cap (and other factors).


There is a small volume of trading today on #RBTC.

Today's 24-hour trading volume across all exchanges for RSK Smart Bitcoin is $3,696.


The circulating supply of RBTC is 3,141 coins, which is 0% of the total coin supply.

A highlight of RSK Smart Bitcoin is it's amazingly small supply of coins, as this supports higher prices due to supply and demand in the market.


RBTC has limited pairings with other cryptocurrencies, but has at least 2 pairings and is listed on at least 2 crypto exchanges.

View #RBTC trading pairs and crypto exchanges that currently support #RBTC purchase.



Homomorphic signatures

Approaching the topic and the main proposals. — The author thanks Janko Ferlic and Unsplash for the image — Brief introduction - Essentially, in a homomorphic signature scheme, a user Alice signs some dataset D using her secret key and uploads the signed data to an untrusted third party (either a server or a smart contract, for instance). This third party can run some computation f over the signed data and homomorphically derive a short signature σ_[f, y], certifying that y is the correct output of the computation f. Anybody will be able to take the tuple {f, y, σ_[f, y]} and get convinced, using Alice’s public key, that y is correct without having to retrieve the underlying data. — Basic definitions and concepts - A homomorphic signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms: Set(𝜆, n): it takes as inputs a security parameter 𝜆 and an integer n > 0. The output is a key pair (sk, pk). It also determines the space of messages M, the space of signatures S and the set F of admissible functions f: Mⁿ → M., Sig(sk, 𝜏, m, i): it takes as inputs a secret key sk, a tag 𝜏 ∈ {0, 1}^𝜆, a message m ∈ M and an index i ∈ {0, …, n}. The output is a signature σ ∈ S associated with the ith message m of the data set tagged by 𝜏., Vrf(pk, 𝜏, m, σ, f): it takes as input a public key pk, a tag 𝜏 ∈ {0, 1}^𝜆, a message m ∈ M, a signature σ ∈ S and a function f ...

Blind Signatures

You did “not” see such a good introduction coming. — The author thanks Unsplash and Osarugue Igbinoba for this image — Basic definitions and proposals - Blind signatures are an extension of digital signatures which provide privacy by allowing a user to obtain a signature from a signer on a message without the signer being able to see the contents of the blinded message. If the signer is later presented with the signed document he cannot relate it neither to the signing session nor to the user on behalf of whom he has signed the message. A blind signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms {KeyGen, Sign, Verify} such that: KeyGen is an algorithm that on the input of a security parameter, outputs a pair of keys pk and sk., Sign is an interactive protocol between a signer S and a user U. The input of S is a secret key sk, whereas the input of U is a public key pk and a message m ∈ M from a message space M. The output of S is a view 𝜈 (seen as a random variable) and the output of U is a signature 𝜎., Verify is a verification algorithm that outputs 1 if 𝜎 is a valid signature and 0 otherwise., Security in blind signatures is captured by two concepts: blindness and unforgeability. Blindness prevents a malicious signer from learning information about a user’s message. On the other hand, unforgeability ensures that each completed Sign execution yields at most k signatures after k interact...

Porting a ZK Rollup Payments Solution from Ethereum to RSK

By Raúl Laprida, Julian Len, Shreemoy Mishra, and Diego Masini The need for cheap and fast payments Over the past couple of years DeFi protocols have dominated the scene compared to other use cases of public blockchains. In the case of Ethereum, the growth of DeFi has even priced out some other applications. The RSK ecosystem has also experienced its share of growth of DeFi projects. Despite the striking growth, current DeFi protocols — with leveraged trading, automated market maker pools, yield farming and so on — remain quite complex for regular people to use in their daily lives. IOV Labs is targeting the development of simpler financial products including those for cheap and fast P2P payments. For a long time, payment channels were thought to offer the best approach for P2P payments. However, despite their technical maturity, projects such as the Lightning Network on Bitcoin or the Raiden network on Ethereum have not gained mass adoption. Similarly, on RSK, the Lumino project also struggled with adoption. The challenges are not purely technological. For instance, in a recent blog post, developers of the Breeze wallet suggest that payment failures in the lightning network frequently arise due to liquidity issues. This is not to say that payment channels are a dead end. On the contrary, there is a lot of renewed interest in using them to support stablecoin payments. One prominent example is a new proposal call...

On UC non-interactive, proactive, threshold ECDSA

A presentation of the scheme, and a bit more — Introduction to threshold schemes - An (m, n)-threshold signature scheme is a digital signature scheme where any m or more signers from a group of n signers can produce signatures on behalf of the group. This signature can be later verified with a public group key, which is generated after combining the public keys of the participants. In general, a threshold signature does not reveal the actual group members that have cooperated to produce it. The goal of a threshold signature scheme is to enforce control over the signing capability (by setting m > 1), to eliminate single points of failure (by setting n > 1), or both. Each group of signers can be managed by a trusted group authority, which oversees joining and leaving the group. Many groups can choose to be managed by the same trusted group authority, or a group can choose to fully distribute the group management among its members such that every member is involved in all management operations. Any subset of m (or more) out of n members of a group G can produce a signature. To do so, each member contributes a partial signature to a designated combiner, and the combiner derives the intended threshold signature from the partial signatures. Everyone who has access to the public group key of group G can verify the threshold signature. The designated combiner can be a real entity such as the trusted group authority, or ...

A comparison of Bitcoin bridging protocols

In this article, we review different existing Bitcoin bridging protocols and compare them to the Powpeg, which is the solution implemented by RSK. The main purpose of a bridging protocol is to transfer value across blockchains. In the case of Bitcoin bridges, existing protocols usually lock BTC on Bitcoin to mint or unlock some kind of token on a remote blockchain. We refer to the process of transferring bitcoin to a remote chain as peg-in, and to the process of transferring bitcoin back to Bitcoin as peg-out. We will use the following criteria in our evaluation of the different protocols: Decentralization: the amount of decentralization provided by the protocol, Usability: various metrics related to user satisfaction, such as speed, fees, and bridging capabilities, Security: we analyze the security of the protocol from the point of view of four properties: - Consistency: the ability of the protocol to guarantee that no token X can be obtained without the corresponding amount of BTC being locked. - Liveness: the ability of the protocol to guarantee that users can obtain token X through peg-ins - Redeemability: the ability of the protocol to guarantee that users can recover their BTC through peg-outs - Funds protection: the ability of the protocol to guarantee that locked BTC cannot be unlocked without the corresponding amount of token X being locked or burned, — The RSK Powpeg - The Powpeg is the bridging protocol ...

Incremental & Multiset Hashing

Here small variations lead to… small computations. — — Introduction - Hash functions map strings of variable finite length to strings of fixed length. The main property of these functions is its collision resistance, meaning that it is hard to find two different input strings yielding the same result. Incremental hashing, introduced in (Bellare et al.) presents an interesting idea: could it be possible to define hash functions such that, given changes on the input strings, the computations required to update the hash were proportional to the amount of change in the input strings? The applications of incremental hash functions in Blockchain are not abundant, nevertheless one can find a proposal in (Mihajloska et al.) of incremental hashing based on SHA3 which is put into practice by the private Blockchain Kadena (Martino) together with the use of Merkle trees. Kadena uses incremental hashing for the updates of the log among the nodes. The other topic that we are covering in this post is multiset hashing, an interesting primitive where the ordering of the inputs is not important. This kind of hash function maps multisets of arbitrary finite size to hashes of fixed length. They are incremental in that when new members are added to the multiset, the hash can be quickly updated. Multiset hash functions play a role in the construction of cryptographic accumulators, which provide proofs of membership of constant siz...

Measuring RSK Security

A complex system’s security cannot be measured by a single metric. Security is the result of the combined strength of a series of components and their interactions. Security is generally pictured as a chain, because it takes only a weak or faulty link to break it. To measure RSK security, different points of view must be used, and many system components must be reviewed. The broader categories that must be analyzed are design, implementation and operation, the last including the improvement proposal review process and the development lifecycle. The RSK components where security is critical are the peg and the consensus protocols (the selection of the best chain), but there were also critical decisions with long-lasting security implications in the design of RSK VM, node discovery, wire messages and peer scoring components. There is no single measure of security in the blockchain ecosystem. An expert can argue that RSK is more secure than Ethereum by a metric X, while another expert argues Ethereum is more secure by a metric Y, different from X, and both of them can be right. In this article we tackle the problem of measuring RSK security by analyzing the different components in RSK and by doing so from the different angles presented. — General Security - Design. RSK design excels on security. It is robust against the most common attacks known by 2018, but also anticipated and now can resist many attacks that were disco...

“Impermanent loss” is inevitable in AMM DeFi protocols — and that’s totally fine

“Impermanent loss” is inevitable in AMM DeFi protocols — and that’s totally fine - Impermanent loss is the opportunity cost of providing liquidity to constant product Automated Market Making (AMM) DeFi protocols. It is measured as the difference between the value of a Liquidity Provider’s (LP) tokens at the time of withdrawal from the pool, versus the hypothetical situation where the LP had not made the investment at all. As long as an LP remains invested in a constant product decentralized exchange (DEX) pool like Uniswap, the loss is merely an accounting issue. The loss becomes larger as the ratio of token prices outside the pool drifts further away from the point when the LP entered the pool. It is ultimately realized — and becomes a real or “permanent” loss— when an LP withdraws their tokens from the pool. This post explains why providing liquidity to constant product AMM DeFi protocols necessarily involves some impermanent loss. Before proceeding, bear in mind that the loss is merely the cost of doing business — as DEX protocols compensate LPs with income from trading fees and protocol rewards. The idea behind impermanent loss is simple. Suppose the ratio of token prices outside the pool changes (in any direction). The divergence in relative prices within and outside the AMM pool presents traders with the opportunity to exchange tokens (with the DEX) on terms that are more favorable tha...

Aggregate, Threshold, Multisig and Multisignatures

A brief survey and comparison. — — Introduction - Digital signatures play a central role in Blockchain technology since every single transaction needs to be signed to be valid. To be precise, digital signatures have a threefold objective in blockchain protocols: They prove ownership and provide authorization to spend the funds., They prove non-repudiation, meaning that the proof of authorization is undeniable., They prove that a transaction has not and cannot be modified., Current signing schemes, where a single user issues signatures for messages, may suffer from a potential threat since it represents a single point of failure that can ruin the scheme if a malicious user gets control of the secret key. The above problem can be avoided by introducing either multisignature schemes or threshold signatures. Both schemes are quite similar in the sense that they are multiparty protocols and require a minimum of m out of n users to sign a file to prove authenticity. Nevertheless, there are a few, but important, differences between them, and it is the objective of this report to compare, from a high perspective, both signature schemes. Since the field is getting active with several proposals, such as MuSig2 or FROST, it is a good moment for an introduction and a comparison of three techniques that share some similarities and differences and tend to be confused in the blockchain environment. The goal is to present multi...

Flaws in Ethereum’s EIP-1559

EIP-1559 added a mechanism for the Ethereum network to establish a base transaction gas price that dynamically changes depending on the load of the network, measured by gas consumed by blocks. This base gas price is called base fee by the EIP. In this article we show that EIP-1559 is unstable and rational miners may collaborate and easily get rid of it increasing their net revenue 400% until more miners can join, and the block difficulty is adjusted upwards. Even active users may benefit from collaborating with the miners. We show how a simple smart-contract in Ethereum can coordinate the removal of the base fee, for the benefit of all the miners. We compare EIP-1559 with RSK’s minimum gas price system. Finally, we present a partial solution to the EIP-1559 incentive problem which involves reducing the amount of fees burned. Before we start, we note that the term base fee is misleading, because the actual fee amount is computed by multiplying the price by the amount of gas consumed, so in this article we’ll use base gas price instead. With EIP-1559, transactions have a new field, and are serialized using a new format. Instead of specifying a single unique gas price, the fee is specified as a maximum gas price to be paid and a miner tip (called a “priority fee”), which establishes an amount that will be paid to the miner above the base gas price. Since the tip must be positive, the gas price to be paid will always be h...

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